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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (d) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether a search occurred when police officers shined a 
flashlight into an apartment door left partially open by the 
defendant. 
Whether the defendant consented to the officers' entry into 
her apartment. 
If a search and seizure did occur, was it justified by 
exigent circumstances? 
A trial court's legal conclusions based on factual findings 
are reviewed under a nondeferential correction of error standard. 
State v. Beavers, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
2 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On January 1, 1993 a two-car accident occurred in Orem, 
after which one of the cars involved left the scene of the 
accident. Shortly after the accident an Orem police officer 
found the car that left the scene, learned where the driver 
lived, was joined by another officer, and both officers, after an 
encounter with the defendant, entered the driver's apartment 
without a search warrant. The driver subsequently was charged 
with two class B misdemeanors: (1) leaving the scene of an 
accident, and (2) driving under the influence of alcohol. The 
driver, the defendant in this matter, moved to suppress all 
evidence gathered after the officers entered the defendant's 
apartment. The motion to suppress was denied. The defendant 
subsequently was tried for and convicted of both counts as 
charged. The defendant took this appeal, contending the trial 
court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts 
On January 1, 1993, at about 6:00 p.m., a two-car accident 
occurred in Orem, Utah. (Trial Transcript, p. 4). One of the 
cars involved, a full-size brown Buick, left the scene of the 
accident. Id. Officer Denton Johnston responded to the accident 
scene, received a description of the Buick that left the 
accident, and, "due to the time delay, the short time delay 
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between the time it was dispatched to me, the time I arrived," 
radioed other units to look for the Buick in the vicinity of the 
accident scene. (Suppression Hearing Transcript p. 11). Officer 
Terry Steele, responding to Officer Johnston's radio 
transmission, "almost immediately" found at an apartment complex 
nearby the accident scene a Buick matching the one which had left 
the accident scene. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, p. 13). 
Officer Steele approached the Buick and saw "the [car] door was 
ajar approximately and inch, and I smelled a very strong odor of 
alcohol coming from inside of that vehicle." Id. at 14. As 
Officer Steele approached the fourplex in front of which the 
Buick was parked, "I notice the door on the bottom left that had 
the lights out was closing slowly." Id. Officer Steele went to 
an upstairs apartment, learned the owner of the Buick was Kari 
Henrie--the defendant in this case--and that Kari lived in the 
downstairs apartment whose door was closing slowly. Id. Officer 
Steele went down to that apartment, and knocked several times on 
the outer screen door. There was no response. Id. at 15. 
Officer Steele then turned to walk back up the stairs and 
"noticed a purse laying on the stairs next to the wall by the 
door." Id. About the same time Officer Steele found the purse, 
Sgt. Ned Jackson arrived. Id. The purse contained the 
identification of Kari Henrie. Id. at 16. Officer Steele told 
Sgt. Jackson about the door closing slowly and the two officers 
returned to the defendant's door to knock again. Id. Sgt. 
Jackson reached through the screen door, either because there was 
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no screen there or because it was "ripped out" and "knocked real 
hard on the wood door to see if we would get a response, and the 
door opened approximately 18, 20 inches." Id. The wood door 
opened the officers noticed keys in the door handle. Id. The 
officers did not know the keys were in the door prior to Sgt. 
Jackson's knocking. Id. The only indication the officers knew 
the door was ajar before Sgt. Jackson knocked is the trial 
court's suggestion.1 Id. at 23. The apartment interior was 
"pitch black." Id. at 17. (At this point in the narrative, 
there are differences between the officers' recollections of what 
happened at the door. The trial court did not make formal 
findings of fact on this question.) Officer Steele's 
recollection is that once the door opened, Officer Steele shone 
his flashlight into the apartment, believing a person was in the 
apartment, not knowing whether or not that person was injured, 
and while recalling the smell of alcohol coming from the Buick. 
Id. Sgt. Jackson's recollection is that once the door opened, 
Officer Steele pushed the door open "a little further" (id. at 
26), "maybe another foot or so" (id. at 29) and, leither 
simultaneously or immediately subsequent to pushing the door 
further, shone his flashlight into the apartment. (At this point 
1
 After the door opened, it became evident the door was ajar. 
The trial court's suggestion that the door was ajar, and Officer 
Steele's acknowledgement that an ajar door was knocked on, probably 
is an after-the-fact deduction made by both the trial court and 
Officer Steele. There is no suggestion Sgt. Jackson's knock was an 
effort to open the door. The defendant seems to agree that the 
door opening as a result of Sgt. Jackson's knock was not a search. 
(Suppression Hearing Transcript, p. 31; Appellant's Brief, p.5) 
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in the narrative, the officers' recollections converge and are 
materially the same.) Officer Steele's flashlight illuminated 
"somebody in a back room sitting on a bed." (Suppression Hearing 
Transcript, p. 17) Officer Steele called out "Kari," and Kari 
stood up and said, "Yes." Id. Officer Steele said, "Can we talk 
to you?" or "We need to talk to you." Id. Kari's response was 
"Okay," or "Yeah," Id. at 17, 21. Immediately subsequent to 
giving that response Kari began a staggered walk toward the door, 
possibly detouring for a moment into another room. Id. at 17, 
22, 27. Both officers entered the apartment when Kari began 
walking toward the door, after she said "Yeah" or "Okay." Id. at 
17. Officer Steele stated his motivation for entering the 
apartment was related to perceiving Kari's stagger. Id. at 21-
22. Sgt. Jackson's testimony is: "We moved in a little further" 
when the officers perceived the staggering, (id. at 27) possibly 
implying the officers already were inside the apartment when they 
first perceived the staggering. Sgt. Jackson's testimony, taken 
in context, indicates the officers entered when Kari began 
walking toward the officers at the door. Id. at 26-27. At that 
point the officers invited the defendant outside to discuss a car 
accident and subsequently gathered evidence leading to her 
convictions for leaving the scene of an accident and driving 
under the influence of alcohol. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The officers at the defendant's front door were in a place 
constituting a lawful vantage point. The fortuitousness of the 
door opening as a consequence of Sgt. Jackson's act of knocking 
on a door that he did not know was ajar did not affect the 
lawfulness of the officers' vantage point. The door consequently 
swinging open was not a search.2 Officer Steele's subsequent 
illumination of the apartment with his flashlight was not a 
search because the defendant was in "open view" or "plain sight" 
from a lawful vantage point. The subsequent conversation between 
the defendant and Officer Steele constituted consent to entry of 
the apartment. Consequently, the trial court was correct in 
denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence gathered as a 
result of the officers' entry into the apartment. 
If this court rules that Officer Steele's illuminating the 
apartment was a protected search, or if this court rules that the 
officers' entry was non-consensual, the search must be 
scrutinized under an exigent circumstances analysis. Under that 
analysis, entry was permissible because the officers had probable 
cause to believe the defendant had committed two misdemeanor 
2
 If this court finds from the record that Officer Steele 
pushed the door open further after Sgt. Jackson's knocking opened 
the door but before Officer Steele shone his flashlight, the City 
abandons this point, because it concedes that if Officer Steele 
indeed pushed open the door further before initiating a 
conversation with the defendant, such conduct is an entry. The 
City's argument here is based on Officer Steele's testimony. If 
this court believes this factual finding dispositive, the City 
requests this case be remanded to the trial court for findings on 
the issue. 
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crimes and because exigent circumstances existed. 
ARGUMENT NO. I 
POINT I 
THE OFFICERS' POSITION AT THE DEFENDANT'S 
APARTMENT DOOR WAS A LAWFUL VANTAGE POINT. 
In State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that places where a government official has 
a right to be include "the entrance of a home, front doors, and 
other open areas accessible to the public at large . . . . " Id. 
The court in State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981), stated: 
"The open pathway to the front door [is] an implied invitation to 
members of the public to enter thereon." Id. The police were 
within their rights to be in the common area open to the public 
in front of the defendant's apartment door. 
POINT II 
WHAT A POLICE OFFICER SEES FROM A LAWFUL 
VANTAGE POINT IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF AN 
UNLAWFUL SEARCH. 
"For an officer to look at what is in open view from a 
position open to the public cannot constitute an invasion of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy." State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 
51 (Utah 1981). The court in Lee noted an important point 
regarding the distinction between use "open view" or "plain 
sight" and "plain view", which is applicable in this matter: 
"Plain view" is the term uniformly given to the doctrine 
invoked for seizing evidence without a warrant at the time 
of an arrest. [citations omitted] We use the term "open 
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view" or "plain sight" to describe the applicable concept in 
the instant case and distinguish it from the "plain view" 
doctrine. [citations omitted] The confusion engendered by 
use of the same term for different concepts is illustrated 
by the dissenting opinion's application of the requirement 
that the incriminating nature of the evidence must be 
immediately apparent. That is a requirement that must be 
met to justify a warrantless seizure incident to arrest 
[citation omitted] under the "plain view" doctrine. 
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48. The New Mexico Court of Appeals also 
has clearly described this distinction in State v. CalvillO/ 792 
P.2d 1157, 1160 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990), wherein it stated: 
The plain view rule has two meanings. First, and most 
commonly, the term describes a seizure of evidence 
inadvertently discovered in the course of an intrusion 
for which there was prior justification, such as a 
search warrant. The second plain view rule applies 
when no fourth amendment search has occurred at all. 
It applies in those instances where an observation is 
made by an officer without a prior physical intrusion 
into a constitutionally protected area. The mere 
looking at that which is open to view is not a search. 
We believe this second type of plain view rule applies 
in the present case. 
Id. , (citations omitted) . Of the two rules described, the one 
applicable in Lee and in the instant matter is the one where no 
search or seizure occurs prior to the time the officer first 
observes the object which, subsequent to the officer's open view 
observation, becomes the subject of a search or seizure. 
The relevance of this is that the City in this point of 
argument is seeking only to defeat the defendant's claim that 
Officer Steele's shining of his flashlight into an open apartment 
door was a search. The City does not think this was a search, 
based on Lee and the authorities discussed below. If this court 
finds the City's argument on this point persuasive, the City 
still must show the defendant consented to the officers' entry. 
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By simply standing at the door, the officers did not perform 
a search. By continuing to stand at the front door once it swung 
open, the officers did not perform a search because they were 
still at their original lawful vantage point and did nothing 
intentionally to enlarge their vantage point. See Calvillo, 792 
P.2d at 1160 ("The fourth amendment has never been extended to 
required law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when 
passing by a home on public thoroughfares.11) . Therefore, up to 
the point when Officer Steele shone his flashlight into the 
darkened apartment, no search had occurred. 
The defendant apparently agrees that the door opening as a 
result of Sgt. Jackson's knock was not a search. (Suppression 
Hearing Transcript, p. 31/ Appellant's Brief, p. 5). The 
defendant argues, however, that Officer Steele's use of his 
flashlight to illuminate the apartment once the door was open 
constituted a search, requiring suppression of evidence gathered 
thereafter. For the reasons discussed below, the City disagrees. 
POINT III 
OFFICER STEELE'S ACT OF SHINING HIS 
FLASHLIGHT INTO THE APARTMENT WAS NOT A 
SEARCH. 
Case law supports the position that a police officer's 
shining of a flashlight into a dwelling or hotel room from a 
lawful vantage point is not an improper search. State v. 
Calvillo, 792 P.2d 1157 (N.M. App. 1990), concluded that a police 
officer shining his flashlight through a window into a house at 
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night to illuminate an object was not a search, where the 
object—a gun—could have been viewed without a flashlight, and 
where the officer was in a common area when he shone his 
flashlight. 
While Calvillo ultimately was decided on exigent 
circumstances grounds, the court there reached a subsidiary 
conclusion that the "officers' actions did not constitute a 
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment, inasmuch as 
the gun was in plain view" from a place where the officers had a 
right to be. Id. at 1160. 
The Calvillo court also observed that the defendant, in his 
position inside his house but in a place observable from the 
common driveway, had a lesser expectation of privacy: "The 
officers looked into the window just as defendant's neighbors 
could have from the same vantage point." Id. The obvious 
distinction between Calvillo's facts and those in the instant 
matter is that in the instant matter the defendant's apartment 
was completely dark, and Officer Steele needed a flashlight to 
see the defendant at all. It should be further noted that the 
Calvillo court used as supporting authority a case where 
contraband was visible and binoculars were used to confirm the 
presence of contraband, indicating that court's analysis 
scrutinized and was directly applicable to situations where 
officers have a relatively certain identification of contraband 
before using flashlights or binoculars for confirmation. 
Calvillo, 792 P.2d at 1160. 
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In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 777 S.W.2d 876 (Ky. 1989), 
officers having a lawful vantage point shone a flashlight through 
a partially open motel room door left open by the defendant, 
observed contraband, subsequently arrested the defendant who was 
in the hallway outside the motel room, obtained a warrant to 
enter the motel room, and seized the contraband. The defendant 
contended the officers use of a flashlight was a search. 
The court disagreed, specifically holding 
that one who asserts that his rights have been violated by 
an unreasonable search accomplished by looking through a 
motel room window or door must show that he took precautions 
sufficient to create an objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy. Otherwise, that which was seen was in plain 
view. 
Johnson, 777 S.W.2d at 876. 
The court concluded that the defendant, by leaving his motel 
door partially open to public view, deprived himself of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and in the same sentence 
discounted the significance of the use of a flashlight: 
Having concluded that appellant's act of leaving his motel 
room door and window partially 'open to public view deprived 
him of a reasonable expectation of privacy, of what 
significance then is the police officer's use of a 
flashlight to look inside? One seeking to maintain his 
privacy should reasonably expect persons disposed to look 
inside a hotel room will not hesitate to enhance their 
visibility by use of a widely available device such as a 
flashlight. 
Id. at 878-79/ see also, State v. Lange, 463 N.W.2d 390 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1990) (while there must be limits to the degree government 
can be permitted to intrude upon a person's home, use of standard 
equipment like binoculars does not violate fourth amendment). 
In the instant matter, the defendant by leaving her 
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apartment door slightly ajar deprived herself of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy: she could have expected anybody—members 
of the public or the police—approaching the common area in front 
of her door for the purpose of contacting her to knock on the 
door and, by so knocking, open it unintentionally. 
The Johnson court stated that existing lighting conditions 
or time of day should not affect whether or not contraband is in 
plain view: 
We are now of the opinion that a determination of whether or 
not contraband is in plain view should not depend on 
existing lighting conditions or time of day. 
Id. at 879, citing Texas v. Brown# 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983) ("... 
the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area simply 
does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth 
Amendment protection."). 
The court did note that "what would be sufficient vigilance 
to preserve one's privacy in a home, apartment of office may be 
insufficient in a motel room." Id. at 878. 
The view that lighting conditions should not affect a 
determination whether an object is in open view is consistent 
with the Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 
48, 51 (Utah 1981), a case involving search of a camper through 
its window, wherein the court stated: 
For an officer to look at what is in open view from a 
position lawfully accessible to the public cannot constitute 
an invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy. ... 
Furthermore, the use of a flashlight to assist the natural 
vision at night does not make an "observation" a "search." 
Id. 
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The obvious distinction between Calvillo and Johnson and the 
instant matter is that the officers in those two cases 
encountered pre-existing conditions; in the instant matter the 
officers unintentionally created the circumstance giving them the 
open view by knocking on a door they did not know was ajar. 
Notwithstanding this distinction, the City maintains its position 
that by leaving the door ajar, the defendant deprived herself of 
a reasonable expectation of privacy from any person attempting to 
contact her by knocking on her door. 
The rationale of Lee, Calvillo, and Johnson supports the 
position that where an officer occupies a lawful vantage point 
and observes from that vantage point an object or person in open 
view, that object or person is not the subject of an unlawful 
search, whether or not the officer uses a flashlight to alter 
lighting conditions, even where the person is located in a 
residence. The City requests this court to so hold. 
The foregoing case law does not directly support the above 
position in cases where officers unintentionally enlarge the open 
view their vantage point provides. But where the officers did 
nothing intrusive, unreasonable or intentional to enlarge their 
open view, such a conclusion is logical. This conclusion is 
further supported where a defendant has deprived herself of or at 
least diminished her reasonable expectation of privacy by her own 
act of leaving a door ajar. 
Since no unlawful search occurred when Officer Steele used 
his flashlight to illuminate the apartment, evidence gathered 
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after that point need not be suppressed, if the officers had 
consent to enter the apartment. 
POINT IV 
THE DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE 
OFFICERS' WARRANTLESS ENTRY. 
When Officer Steele saw the defendant stand up, he engaged 
her in a brief conversation and encounter which constituted 
voluntary consent to entry. The analysis of whether the consent 
exception to the warrant requirement applies to specific 
circumstances necessarily is a two-step analysis. The City bears 
burden of showing (1) consent was given, and (2) such consent was 
voluntary. 
While this court has addressed how to determine whether 
consent was voluntary in State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992), Utah appellate courts apparently have not addressed 
how to determine whether or not consent was given at all. 
In People v. Henderson, 568 N.E.2d 1234 (111. 1990), the 
Illinois Supreme Court promulgated a standard requiring that the 
circumstances leading to entry of a home must be such that the 
police reasonably could have believed they had been given consent 
to enter: 
We now hold that, when a court is deciding whether 
consent was given (not whether that consent was 
voluntary), the circumstances must have been such that 
the police could have reasonably believed they had been 
given consent to enter. ... This test is consistent 
with the fourth amendment proscription against 
unreasonable search and seizures. 
Id. at 1^54 (citations omitted). 
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"Consent may be explicit, or it may be inferred from the 
totality of the circumstances." People v. Rivers, 727 P.2d 394, 
398 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986). See also, United States v. Tragash, 
691 F.Supp. 1066 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (consent to a search may be in 
the form of words, gestures or conduct)/ Bradley v. State, 662 
P.2d 993 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (consent must unequivocal and 
specific). 
Under the circumstances of the instant matter, the 
defendant's words and conduct gave the officers a reasonable 
belief the defendant consented to the officers' entry. When 
Officer Steele called out "Kari," she responded "Yes." Officer 
Steele then' said, "Can we talk to you?" or "We need to talk to 
you." Kari's response was "Okay" or "Yeah." Immediately 
subsequent to those words of assent, Kari began walking to the 
door, showing a further willingness to talk with the officers in 
addition to her words of assent. (Suppression Hearing 
Transcript, p. 17, 21). Under these circumstances, the officers 
had a reasonable belief the defendant gave them consent to enter. 
Step two requires a showing that the defendant gave her 
consent voluntarily. This court has stated that it makes this 
determination by 
lookfing] to the totality of the circumstances to ascertain 
whether consent in fact was voluntarily given and not the 
result of duress or coercion express or implied. The State 
bears the burden of showing the consent was voluntary. We 
further look to see if there is clear and positive testimony 
that the consent was unequivocal and freely given. 
Caster, 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
The evidence is that the defendant immediately verbally 
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responded in the affirmative to Officer Steele's request to talk 
with her. Officer Steele only called out once, after which the 
defendant responded and even walked toward the door to further 
engage the officers. Additionally, there is no evidence of 
duress or coercion. 
Since the defendant voluntarily consented to the officer's 
entry, the evidence of her involvement in a hit and run accident 
and in a DUI gathered in her apartment is not the subject of an 
unlawful search or seizure and need not be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT II 
Even if this court finds that Officer Steele's use his 
flashlight to illuminate the defendant's apartment, or the 
officers' subsequent entry constituted a search and/or seizure, 
the entry was permissible because the officers had probable cause 
to believe the defendant had committed two misdemeanors and 
because exigent circumstances existed. 
POINT I 
THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE 
DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED TWO MISDEMEANOR 
CRIMES. 
Both probable cause and exigent circumstances must be shown 
to validate the officers' entry into the apartment. State v. 
Beavers, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 40 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Here, 
because entry into a home is involved, that burden is 
particularly heavy. State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah 
17 
Ct. App. 1991). 
a. The police had probable cause to 
believe the defendant had committed 
the crime of hit and run. 
As the defendant acknowledges, the police had probable cause 
to believe the defendant had committed the crime of hit and run. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6). Officer Steele found a perfect match, 
including license plate identification, of the Buick involved in 
the reported accident, (Suppression Transcript, p. 14). 
b. The police had probable cause to 
believe the defendant had committed 
the crime of DU1. 
The police also had probable cause to believe the defendant 
had committed the crime of DUI. "The test [for probable case] is 
whether the facts known to [the officer], and the fair inferences 
[to be drawn] therefrom, would justify a reasonable and prudent 
person in his position in believing that appellant had committed 
the offense." State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) . 
Under this standard, the officers had probable cause that 
the defendant had committed the crime of DUI. They had the 
following information. Th6 Buick was parked unusually: "The 
right front tire was against the curb. The right rear tire was 
back a ways, probably a foot, foot and a half away from the curb. 
I noticed it was parked kind of funny." (Suppression Transcript, 
p. 13). The door was ajar approximately an inch. Id. at 14. A 
"very strong" odor of alcohol emanated from the vehicle, which 
odor Officer Steele remembered when he stood at the door the 
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second time. Id. at 14, 17. The defendant's apartment door was 
closing slowly as Officer Steele arrived. Id. at 15. The 
defendant did not respond to Officer Steele's knocks on the 
screen door, indicating perhaps she had something to hide. Id. 
The defendant's purse lay on the common area near the door to her 
apartment, indicating the kind of inadvertence associated with 
intoxication. Id. The defendant's keys were in the door of her 
apartment, indicating further inadvertence. Id. at 16. When the 
defendant did respond, she staggered as she walked, which was 
observed prior to the officer's entry. Id. at 22, 27. With the 
exception of the strong odor of alcohol and possibly the unusual 
parking position of the defendant's car, most of these facts, 
including the fact of the accident itself, indicate a person 
fleeing. Fleeing an a auto accident scene tends to suggest the 
driver had been drinking, "intoxication being a common reason 
people flee accidents." State v. Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55, 60 
(Minn. 1988). Further, the fact of the accident itself indicates 
inattentive driving, "the sort of inattention that often is 
explained by the defendant's being under the influence of 
alcohol." Id. 
Under these facts known to the officers, and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom, the officers were justified in 
believing the defendant had committed the crime of DUI. Indeed, 
to suggest the opposite based on these facts, known to trained 
officers, is untenable. 
In addition to probable cause, exigent circumstances were 
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required for the officers to enter the defendant's apartment. 
POINT II 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED WHEN THE 
OFFICERS ENTERED THE DEFENDANT'S APARTMENT. 
This court recently described the exigent circumstances 
doctrine: 
Exigent circumstances are those that would cause a 
reasonable person to believe that entry was necessary to 
prevent physical harm to the officer or other persons, the 
destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, 
or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate 
law enforcement efforts. The need for an immediate search 
must be apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh 
the important protection of individual rights provided by 
the warrant requirement. ... The existence of exigent 
circumstances must be based on the reasonable belief of the 
police officer. 
State v. Beavers, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 40-41 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). The reviewing court's "task is to review the totality of 
the facts and circumstances of the particular case to determine 
if the finding of exigency was proper." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 
1255 (Utah 1987) . 
In this brief the City only will address the destruction of 
evidence exigent circumstance, i.e., dissipation of the 
defendant's blood alcohol level or other evidence of 
intoxication. There can be no question that as time passed after 
the accident, the defendant's blood alcohol level was declining. 
The generally accepted rate at which the human body metabolizes 
alcohol is between .015 to .02% per hour, depending on body 
weight. See generally, B. Byrne & R. Reece, Trying the DUI Case 
in Utah, Appendix 2d (1989); see also, People v. Odenweller, 527 
20 
N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. A.D. 1988) (MERCURE, J., dissenting). As time 
passed from when the defendant had been driving, evidence 
literally was being destroyed. DUI evidence is unique in this 
regard in that once alcohol ingestion ceases, evidence of 
intoxication steadily is destroyed. 
The United States Supreme Court referred to the need to 
ascertain a driver's blood alcohol level as an "exigent 
circumstance" in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753-54 (1984) . 
The dispositive question, therefore, is, given the unique nature 
of evidence of intoxication, is the need to gather such evidence 
a
 sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless home search or 
seizure? For the reasons discussed below, the City believes it 
is, especially in circumstances like the instant matter where a 
defendant commits a crime—leaving the scene—which prevents law 
enforcement from observing gathering evidence at the scene of the 
accident. 
POINT III 
CASE LAW SUPPORTS THE POSITION THAT EVIDENCE 
OF INTOXICATION SHOULD BE A RECOGNIZED 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE. 
The defendant cites Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), 
for the proposition that the exigency of needing to obtain blood 
alcohol levels is insufficient to justify a warrantless home 
search and seizure. (Appellant's Brief, p. 8). The rationale of 
Welsh distinguish it from the instant matter and support the 
opposite conclusion in the present case. 
The rationale in Welsh was based largely on Wisconsin's 
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characterization of DUI as a minor offense. The Court's 
statement of the issue was: "whether, and if so under what 
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from 
making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in order to 
arrest him for a nonmailable traffic offense. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 
742 (emphasis added). Both the majority and concurring opinions 
took pains to emphasize the importance to the Court's holding of 
Wisconsin's characterization of DUI as a minor offense: 
At the time in question, the Vehicle Code provided that a 
first offense for [DUJ] was a noncriminal violation subject 
to a civil forfeiture proceeding for a maximum fine of $200. 
Id. at 746. 
The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first 
offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, 
civil forfeiture for which no imprisonment is possible. 
This is the best indication of the State's interest in 
precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily 
identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a 
decision to arrest. Given this expression of the State's 
interest, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply 
because evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level 
might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. 
Id. at 755 (emphasis added). 
I yield to no one in my profound personal concern about the 
unwillingness of our national consciousness to face up to— 
and do something about—the continuing slaughter upon our 
Nation's highways, a good percentage of which is caused by 
drivers who are drunk or semi-incapacitated because of 
alcohol or drug ingestion. ... [I]t is amazing to me that 
[Wisconsin] still classifies driving while intoxicated as a 
civil violation that allows only a money forfeiture ... so 
long as it is a first offense. ... But if Wisconsin and 
other States choose by legislation thus to regulate their 
penalty structure, there is, unfortunately, nothing in the 
United States Constitution that says they may not do so. 
Id. at 755-56 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). 
Of further significance is the court's f,hold[ing] that an 
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important factor to be considered when determining whether 
exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for 
which the arrest is being made." Id. at 753. The court did not 
have "occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may 
impose and absolute ban on warrantless arrests for certain minor 
offenses," Id, at 749, n. 11. The gravity of the offense is an 
important factor for determining whether exigent circumstances 
justify a warrantless in-home arrest. State v. Ramirez/ 814 P.2d 
at 1134. 
Unlike the State of Wisconsin, Utah is one of those States 
whose expression of state interest in its DUI statutory scheme 
clearly shows that this State considers DUI a serious offense. 
First, DUI in Utah is a criminal offense for which criminal 
jeopardy attaches; it is not a civil offense. Cf., City of Orem 
v. Crandall, 760 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Second, Utah's statutory scheme shows that the citizens of 
this state consider DUI to be a serious offense: on arrest for 
DUI the driver's vehicle is impounded, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.30 (1993); DUI is a class B misdemeanor, the punishment for a 
first conviction being a mandatory two days in jail and a 
possibility of 10 days in jail, id. at § 41-6-44(4) (a); 
additionally, a first time conviction requires the defendant to 
participate in assessment and education for alcohol dependency 
and rehabilitation, id. at 41-6-44(4)(c)(i). This on a first 
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conviction.3 The penalties increase for subsequent offenses. 
Id. 
Welsh indicates that the gravity of the offence 
determination for fourth amendment purposes be made by viewing 
how seriously a state considers a crime. Given that Welsh 
considered the gravity of the offense in terms of Wisconsin's 
interest in the offense of DUI, as shown through its lenient 
statutory scheme, this court should view the gravity of DUI in 
Utah through Utah's statutory scheme, which makes DUI a serious 
offense: 
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely 
among the States, the penalty that may attach to any offense 
seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication 
of the State's interest in arresting individuals suspected 
of committing that offense. 
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754, n. 14.4 
The clear and consistent indication from Utah's statutory 
scheme regarding DUI is that Utah considers DUI a serious 
3
 Because of Wisconsin's statutory scheme, the Court in Welsh 
imputed to the investigating officers the assumption that the 
defendant there was being investigated for a nonjailable traffic 
offense. Because Utah's statutory scheme makes firs-time DUI a 
mandatory-jail offense, the officers here should have imputed to 
them the assumption that they were investigating a jailable 
offense. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 746, n. 6. 
4
 Here the City respectfully disagrees with this court's 
statement that the Court in Welsh characterized "drunk driving as 
minor in the context of considering an intrusion into the sanctity 
of a home . ..." State v. Beavers, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 42, n. 7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) . The Court very clearly considered the 
seriousness of DUI in terms of Wisconsin's statutory scheme, not 
the Court's own perspective: "Nor do we mean to suggest that the 
prevention of drunken driving is not properly of major concern to 
the States. The State of Wisconsin, however ... has chosen to 
severely limit the penalties ...." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754, n. 14. 
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offense, and it should not be considered a minor offense for the 
purpose of exigent circumstances analysis. 
The fact that evidence was being destroyed or dissipated, 
and the fact that this State, as shown in its statutory scheme, 
considers DUI a serious offense, both militate toward a finding 
of exigency. This court still must make a fact-specific inquiry 
to determine the existence of exigent circumstances; its "task is 
to review the totality of the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case to determine if the finding of exigency [by the 
trial court] was proper." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 
1987) . 
The following circumstances, viewed cumulatively, are 
important to determining whether exigency justifies a warrantless 
entry. See People v. Odenweller, 527 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. A.D. 
1988). The officers' entry was made at a reasonable hour of the 
day. The manner of entry was peaceful. The officers merely 
stepped through a door which opened fortuitously as a result of a 
knock. The entry occurred immediately subsequent to what the 
City has argued constituted voluntary consent; it was at least a 
relatively cordial encounter. Once inside the apartment the 
officers stayed close to the door, not wandering through the 
apartment to find the defendant. Though this was not hot 
pursuit, the search for the defendant covered only a matter of 
minutes, covering a fairly direct line from the accident scene to 
her apartment; such an investigation can be characterized as a 
'luke warm7 investigation. There was a trail of evidence leading 
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from the Buick to the apartment door: car door ajar with alcohol 
emanating from it; purse on the porch; door closing slowly. The 
officers had probable cause to believe a fleeing and now hiding 
defendant had committed not one, but two misdemeanor offenses. 
Considered in light of these circumstances, the City 
believes its officers acted properly in this case when they 
entered without a warrant because they had every reason to 
believe the defendant had committed two crimes and because 
evidence of one of these crimes, a serious one to which 
substantial sanctions attach, was being lost as time passed. The 
need for immediate search was apparent to the officers because of 
the unique character of evidence of alcohol intoxication, and, 
under these circumstances the need to obtain such evidence 
outweighed the defendant's privacy expectations, which had been 
substantially diminished when she left her door ajar. Therefore, 
trial court's finding of exigency should be sustained. 
Such a ruling would be consistent with rulings from other 
jurisdictions. See State v. Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55 (Minn. 1988) 
(held that officers' warrantless entry of a hit and run suspect's 
home was justified by exigent circumstances, where investigation 
was continual and police had probable cause to believe defendant 
was intoxicated); People v. Odenweller, 527 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. 
A.D. 1988) (held that warrantless entry was justified by exigent 
circumstances where short investigation ensued after hit and run 
driver left the scene and where police had strong evidence 
defendant had been driving while intoxicated) . 
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There is an additional reason this court should sustain the 
trial court's finding of exigency. Any delay in apprehending a 
DUI defendant who is in a residence allows that defendant to 
consume or claim to have consumed more alcohol during the interim 
between being report to law enforcement and apprehension, thus 
tainting evidence of intoxication for use at trial and 
frustrating law enforcement efforts. 
The City emphasizes it is not requesting this court to 
formulate a broad rule on this issue, the exigent circumstance 
inquiry is fact-specific. The City's position is that on the 
facts of this case, exigent circumstances existed, and the City 
requests this court to so hold. While a contrary holding would 
confer substantial rights on DUI defendants, it also would result 
in "the diminution of the powers of law enforcement which are 
aimed at promoting the public good by the prevention of crime." 
State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225 (Conn. 1992) (COVELLO, J., 
dissenting). 
DUI is not a minor offense in Utah. It is unique in that 
evidence of it is subject to being destroyed through natural 
processes of the body. Since the evidence is contained in the 
suspect's body itself, a suspect's body must be secured as soon 
as possible after the suspect is detected so the evidence cannot 
be tainted by subsequent acts or alleged acts of alcohol 
ingestion. Under the facts and exigencies of this case, the 
officers' were justified in immediately apprehending the 
defendant. To do otherwise would have frustrated valid efforts 
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to detect and apprehend a person who created a risk to public 
safety. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the City respectfully requests this court to 
uphold the trial court's ruling denying the defendant's 
suppression motion. 
DATED and submitted this October 4, 1993. 
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